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Introduction 
 
Open science refers to all scientific culture that is described by its openness. It 
may often include features of open access, open data, and open source. Fecher 
and Friesike (2014) identify five open science schools of thought: the public 
school, which is about the accessibility of knowledge creation; the democratic 
school, which is about equality of access to knowledge; the pragmatic school, 
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Open science refers to all scientific culture that is described by 
its openness. It may often include features of open access, open 
data, and open source. Fecher and Friesike (2014) identify five 
open science schools of thought: the public school, which is about 
the accessibility of knowledge creation; the democratic school, 
which is about equality of access to knowledge; the pragmatic 
school, which is about collaborative research; the infrastructure 
school, which is about the technological architecture; and the 
measurement school, which is about alternative impact 
measurement. This article argues that there are only two open 
science schools, the public and democratic iterations, that can 
defend themselves against the serious epistemic objections to 
open science. In addition, if society supports an “open discussion” 
policy, societies will gain much more benefit from open science. 
These two schools, therefore, have more epistemic value than the 
other schools. 	
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which is about collaborative research; the infrastructure school, which is about 
the technological architecture, and the measurement school, which is about 
alternative impact measurement. 
This article argues that there are only two open science schools, the public 
and democratic iterations that can defend themselves against the serious 
epistemic objections to open science. In addition, if society supports an “open 
discussion” policy, both scientists and citizens will gain much more benefit from 
open science.  
The article is divided into three sections. The first section will briefly explain 
open science’s feature and schools of thought. The next section will engage in the 
debates about serious epistemic objections to open science and will propose that 
some schools of thought can defend themselves against such objections. The final 
section will propose that if society supports an “open discussion” policy, both 
scientists and citizens will gain much more benefit from open science.  
 
 
Open science’s feature sand schools of thought  
 
As I mentioned earlier, open science may often include features of open access, 
open data, and the open source. By "open access," I mean it is free on the 
internet, permitting users to read, download, copy, distribute, print, search, or 
link to the full texts of these articles. Some open science theorists such as Peter 
Kraker (2011) state that open science means opening up the research procedure 
by making all its outcomes openly accessible on the World Wide Web. By “open 
data,” I mean publishing the datasets collected in the research process on the 
World Wide Web without restricting their use (Murray-Rust, 2008: 52). Finally, 
by “open source,” I mean software that is made available under a license that 
permits anyone to use, change, improve, or derive from existing source code, and 
sometimes even to distribute the software (Feller and Fitzgerald, 2002: 646). 
As I have mentioned, Fecher and Friesike (2014) identify five open science 
schools of thought: the public school, which is about the accessibility of 
knowledge creation; the democratic school, which is about equality in accessing 
knowledge; the pragmatic school, which is about collaborative research; the 
infrastructure school, which is about technological architecture; and the 
measurement school, which is about alternative impact measurement. Fecher and 
Friesike look at the literature on open science and identify its schools of thought 
by referring to the difference of aims and assumptions about open science. But 
they do not make a clear-cut distinction between these schools. They just want to 
give a comprehensible overview of the predominant thought patterns in the 
current open science discourse. I will briefly describe the five schools of thought 
Fecher and Friesike propose for basic information for discussion.  
 
(1) The public school 
According to the public school, science needs to be accessible to the public. 
Advocates of the public school usually claim that Web 2.0 technologies allow 
scientists to open up the research process and arrange the product of their 
research for interested non-experts. (Fecher and Friesike, 2014: 19) Fecher and 
Friesike recognize two different streams within the public school.The first is 
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concerned with the accessibility of the research process, while the second is 
associated with the comprehensibility of the research result. Both streams include 
the relationship between scientists and the public and describe openness as 
dedication to a wider audience. Morris and Mietchen (2010), for example, 
maintain that Web 2.0 can make knowledge production accessible for the public. 
In this regard, Cribb and Sari demand a change in the scientific writing style: 
“Science is by nature complicated, making it all the more important that good 
science writing should be simple, clean and clear” (Cribb and Sari: 2010, 15). 
 
(2) The democratic school  
An assumption of the democratic school is equality of access to knowledge. 
According to the democratic school, knowledge should be equally distributed. 
Unlike the public school, which promotes accessibility in terms of participation 
inresearch and its comprehensibility, advocates of the democratic school focus on 
the principal access to the products of research (Fecher and Friesike, 2014: 25). 
Cribb and Sari, for example, make the case for open access to scientific 
knowledge as a human right. They contend there is a gap between the creation 
and the sharing of knowledge. While scientific knowledge doubles every 5 years, 
access to this knowledge remains limited (Cribb and Sari, 2010: 3). Phelps regards 
open access to research publications as a catalyst for development, whereas 
limited access to a small subset of people with subscriptions is a hindrance to 
development. He argues that research funded by taxpayers should be made 
available to the public free of charge so that the taxpayer does not in effect pay 
twice for the research (Phelps, 2012: 1). 
 
(3) The pragmatic school 
According to the concept of this school, knowledge creation would be more 
efficient if scientists worked together. Its central aim is to open up the process of 
knowledge creation to make research and knowledge dissemination more efficient 
(Fecher and Friesike, 2014: 32)/Advocates of the pragmatic school argue that 
science can be optimized in many ways, for instance, by allowing collaboration 
through online tools. Gowers and Nielsen (2009) argue that natural sciences can 
profit from researchers' collaboration. Tacke (2010) proposes that complex 
situations can be better judged by the collective wisdom of the crowds.  
 
(4) The infrastructure school 
The basis of infrastructure school is that efficient research depends on the 
available tools and applications. Its central aim is to create openly available 
platforms, tools and services for scientists (Fecher and Friesike, 2014: 36). Foster 
(2003) claims that science is as much based on computation, data analysis, and 
collaboration as on the efforts of individual experimentalists and theorists, driven 
by increasingly complex problems and by advances in understanding and 
technique, and powered by the emergence of the Internet. 
 
(5) The measurement school 
The measurement school posits that scientific contributions need alternative 
impact measurements. Evidently, the impact factor, which measures the number 
of citations in a journal, influences a researcher’s reputation and his or her job 
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opportunities. It is therefore hardly surprising that a discussion about open 
science is accompanied by the essential problem of how scientific impact can be 
measured in the digital age. For that reason, this school makes the case for an 
alternative and faster impact measurement that includes other forms of 
publications (Fecher and Friesike, 2014: 40). Priem and Light Costello (2010) 
argue that Twitter posts, which are much faster than traditional citations, can be 
used to measure scientific impact.  
Open collaborative science projects closely connect with open science because 
they embrace the concepts of open science: open access, open data, and open 
source. Examples of open collaborative science projects is the Polymath Project 
(in which Tim Gower posted a mathematical problem on his blog that was then 
solved by a few experts), the Galaxy Zoo Project (an online astronomy project 
that amateurs can join to assist morphological classification) and the eBird 
Project (an online project that citizens can join to report bird observations). 
 
 
Epistemic objections to open science 
 
In this section, I will discuss serious epistemic objections to open science and 
will propose that particular schools of thought, the public and democratic 
schools, can effectively defend themselves from such objections or have fewer 
epistemic problems than the other schools. By “epistemic objection,” I mean an 
objection that is about beliefs or a justification for a belief. Therefore, an 
argument that rejects open science due to the concept of copyright is not an 
“epistemic” objection to open science, but an argument that rejects open science 
because “open science can make citizens generate a false belief” is an epistemic 
objection.  
First, Neilsen (2012) explains that an objection is an epistemic objection to 
open science. Specifically, some might claim that the public will misunderstand 
science information because of open science. That is, because most scientific 
knowledge are complex, open science that openly reveals scientific knowledge to 
the public may make some people, especially those who do not have enough basic 
scientific knowledge, misunderstand science. He maintains that NASA's case in 
2009 shows that the scientific society worries about citizens’ misunderstanding 
scientific information. In 2009, NASA launched the Kepler spacecraft and 
announced that they would release collected data in June 2010. Later, they 
decided to postpone release so their scientists could look at it first. Their 
rationale was that non-scientists might unintentionally misapprehend the data, 
and NASA scientists thought it would be preferable for them to be familiar with 
the data in advance so that they could report on it (Nielsen, 2012: 201). 
In response, I grant that this epistemic objection can attack some open science 
schools of thought. I actually agree that if scientists reveal their research in the 
same way as they write in academic journals, the public may definitely 
misunderstand the information. However, I do not think that this situation is a 
serious epistemic objection to all open science schools of thought. The basic 
assumption of the public and democratic schools is about the accessibility of 
knowledge, so its proponents work to make the public understand the complexity 
of scientific knowledge since they want to make science accessible for all levels of 
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citizens. Many books explain how scientists can communicate to the public. Open 
Science: Sharing Knowledge in the Global Century (2010) argues that “Science is 
by its nature complicated, making it all the more important that good science 
writing should be simple, clean and clear” (Cribb and Sari, 2010: 15). The book 
claims that scientists need to reflect on the audience since this is the first step in 
writing well. Specifically, they should think about who the audience is, what they 
want from the science, and what their level of technical understanding is. This 
book convinces scientists that simplicity is strength and is a good foundation for 
communication. The audience can easily understand the complex ideas of 
scientific knowledge if the language is simple and clear. This book also directs 
scientists to use short sentences and use language their audience uses habitually. 
A good science article often goes directly to the meaning of the science to society, 
rather than to the science itself. According to these two schools, open science 
should not focus on the collaboration without realizing the importance of 
communication with the public. If we know that open science can cause citizens 
who do not have much basic knowledge about science to misunderstand scientific 
information, we should find a way to make them understand scientific 
information better instead of rejecting open science. 
In sum, it seems that the public and democratic schools of thought have 
already recognized the problem of misunderstanding, and since their central aim 
is citizens’ accessibility to scientific knowledge, advocates of these two schools try 
hard to make citizens correctly and equally understand scientific knowledge. 
Unlike the other schools of thought that aim only at scientific societies, citizens 
are involved as a part of science in these two schools of thought. Therefore, the 
public and democratic schools of thought that focus not only on the advantage of 
scientific societies but also the advantage of citizens have more epistemic value 
than any other schools and also can refute this objection to open science.  
Another epistemic objection to open science is about the methodology of open 
collaborative science projects. That is, it seems that open collaborative science 
projects focus on collaborative research between scientists and novices. Many 
collaborative open science projects invite the public to help scientists. This shows 
that the open science projects require collective knowledge that is collaboratively 
generated from the group. “Groupthink,” which causes members of the group to 
unquestioningly follow the word of the leader, can occur in the process of 
generating knowledge. Groupthink, a term coined by social psychologist Irving 
Janis (1972), occurs when a group makes defective decisions because group 
pressures lead to a deterioration of mental efficiency, reality testing, and moral 
judgment. Groups affected by groupthink ignore alternatives and tend to take 
irrational actions that dehumanize other groups. A group is especially vulnerable 
to groupthink when its members are similar in background, when the group is 
insulated from outside opinions, and when there are no clear rules for decision-
making. Therefore, groupthink implies a negative picture for collective 
intelligence. It indicates that groups often do not do a good job of taking 
advantage of their collective knowledge. 
However, Nielsen (2012) argues that science is well suited for collective 
intelligence. Most fields of science have a large repository of powerful techniques 
shared by the scientists working in that field. The discovery of the structure of 
DNA is an example that demonstrates the strength of the shared praxis in 
science. I actually agree that groupthink can happen during open collaborative 
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science projects, but we should not give up on such projects just because it can 
happen. What we should do is prevent groupthink from taking place instead of 
rejecting open science. There are many solutions to protect open science from 
groupthink. According to Irving Janis, decision-making groups are not necessarily 
destined to groupthink. He formulated several ways of preventing groupthink. For 
example, a team should set up several independent groups that work on the same 
problem, all effective alternatives should be examined, and leaders should assign 
each member the role of “critical evaluator” (Janis, 1972: 209-15). This allows 
each member to freely air objections and doubts. Groupthink is not a sufficient 
epistemic reason to repudiate open science because it can happen or can be 
avoided in open science projects.  
Moreover, the public school aims to make science accessible for all levels of 
citizens, and the democratic school aims to make knowledge equally accessible for 
everyone, so both can create an environment that can decrease the groupthink 
problem. If all levels of citizens possess enough scientific information, they can 
critically deliberate the information. This situation can encourage diversity of 
opinion, and diversity can reduce groupthink since there are many ways citizens 
can think about the issue. As we know, a group is especially vulnerable to 
groupthink when its members are similar in background and when the group is 
insulated from outside opinions. If society has diverse opinions, it will be less 
vulnerable to groupthink. Furthermore, we can now communicate and discuss 
anything via Web2.0, which is a convenient tool for deliberating and 
anonymously discussing an issue. Anonymity sometimes causes positive epistemic 
consequences since it enables us to more freely contribute our epistemic resources 
and can enhance error detection by enabling increased transformative criticism to 
weed out error and bias.  
In sum, the public and democratic schools of thought can effectively deal with 
groupthink better than the other schools. The infrastructure school, for instance, 
which aims to create openly available platforms, tools and services for scientists, 
does not focus on ways to reduce groupthink.  
Nielsen (2012) posits another epistemic argument against open science, 
contending that open science, which aims to make scientific research, data, and 
dissemination accessible to all levels of an inquiring society, can be used by those 
who receive the scientific knowledge to do bad things. For example, in 2011, 
Dutch researchers declared their intention to publish a research paper describing 
the formation of a strain of H5N1 influenza that can be simply passed between 
ferrets, the mammals that most closely mimic the human response to the flu. The 
announcement generated a debate in both political and scientific circles about the 
ethical consequences of publishing scientific documents that could be used to 
build biological weapons. This is one example of how science data could possibly 
be abused (Nielsen, 2011: 200). 
This seems to be a serious objection to both the public and democratic schools 
of thought. The more scientific information is known, the more opportunities 
exist for the information to be abused. I accept that data could possibly be 
abused; however, we should not try to prevent such abuse by rejecting open 
science. Scientific data could be useful as well as abused. The most evident 
benefit of widespread open access is to individual citizens. They can simply find 
scientific information about what they want to know, and this ability can better 
their lives. For example, when they are ill, there would be no more restrictions on 
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their ability to download the latest research. They can find medical information, 
including discussions about the information. Therefore, rejecting open science 
because it can possibly be abused may be a hasty decision. This objection only 
reminds scientists to be careful before giving access to their research to citizens. 
It seems that some topics should not be revealed to citizens to protect the 
security of society. But this is not a sufficient reason to limit what open science 
contributes to society.  
To summarize, the public and democratic schools of open science can refute 
serious epistemic objections better than the other schools. If an objection seems 
to directly attack these two schools, the objection is not a sufficient reason to 
reject open science. 
 
 
Open Discussion policy  
 
As noted, some schools of open science can protect themselves from serious 
epistemic objections. Since these schools focus on accessibility and equality of 
access to knowledge, if any governments support such schools of open science, 
there will be more communication from scientists to the ordinary citizen. If 
knowledge is intrinsically valuable, the communication is virtuous and benefits 
the citizen. However, such communication is one-way because it only motivates 
scientists to simplify and spread their scientific knowledge to citizens, not vice 
versa.I propose that societies can take more advantage of these two schools of 
open science if their governments simultaneously support an open discussion 
policy. By “open discussion,” I mean situations in which citizens can discuss the 
scientific information without fear of government retaliation or censorship. This 
policy, plus Web 2.0 technology, will support a fast and real-time 
multidirectional communication among scientists and citizens.  
These communications will benefit both open scientists and citizens. The 
scientists will gain feedback about their research from many points of view. From 
this, they can realize what society wants from them and what the real impacts of 
their research are. In addition to gaining scientific information that may be useful 
for their daily lives, citizens will learn what other citizens think about the 
information, so they can reflect upon others’ opinion. Open discussion in large 
groups usually brings diversity of opinions, and diversity can expand the range of 
possible solutions. This can make citizens more careful before accepting or 
applying the scientific information. Therefore, societies can take better advantage 
of these two schools of open science if their governments concurrently support an 
open discussion policy because the policy supports multidirectional 
communications among scientists and citizens. Such communication will be a 
great benefit to both scientists and ordinary citizens.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, the public and democratic school of open science can defend 
themselves against the serious epistemic objections: misunderstanding and 
groupthink. Specifically, these two schools have already recognized some 
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epistemic objections, especially the problem of misunderstanding scientific 
information, and are working to help scientists communicate with citizens. 
Although there is an epistemic argument against these two schools, the argument 
is not a sufficient reason to reject open science since there are many ways to 
prevent those objections. If we accept that knowledge is valuable in itself and 
that all citizens are equal, these two schools of open science do something that 
has epistemic value, because the aims of these two schools of thought can cause 
all levels of citizens to have more knowledge. Unlike the other schools of thought 
that seems to affect only scientific societies, these two schools directly expand the 
benefits of open science to the levels of an inquiring society, whether novice or 
professional. Furthermore, if their governments simultaneously support an open 
discussion policy, societies can take more advantage of the two schools because 
the policy supports multidirectional communications that will benefit both open 
scientists and ordinary citizens. 
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